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Bewitched, Bothered, and Bewildered: 
 










"In the final analysis, there are only two basic attitudes, two points of view: the 
aesthetic and the moral."  So wrote Thomas Mann.2 Art and morality have an ancient 
quarrel, an ongoing tension that now and then erupts into open hostility.  
 
The moralistic position is that moral reasons, commitments, and values are 
more basic, more commanding, and of more ultimate concern than any others.  
Whether anchored in religion or culture or reason or self, morality overrides aesthetics.  
When the cards of conflict are played, morality is to be trump.  Restriction, censorship, 
or destruction of art works follow.  Thus, Plato banishes the poets from his ideal polis; 
Yahweh commands that "thou shalt not make any graven image"; the early Confucian 
decries "new music" in which "people bend their bodies while they move back and forth, 
and there is a deluge of immoral sounds"; St. Augustine argues for severely restricting 
music in church; the United States government bans James Joyce's Ulysses; the state 
of Israel bans the playing of the music of Richard Wagner; the State of Florida leads the 
nation in attempts to remove books and films from library shelves on moral grounds.3   
 
Aestheticism, on the other hand, holds that aesthetic experience is the greatest 
(or among the greatest) goods available to human beings.  The creation of art is a 
fierce and consuming activity, and those who appreciate the resulting artistic merit have 
a small share in the glory.   Whether divinely inspired or flushed with self-expression, art 
has its own integrity.  And artistic creativity requires freedom from prior restraint.  Thus 
Oscar Wilde wrote that "There is no such thing as a moral or immoral book.  Books are 
well or badly written.  That is all."  And the MGM lion is wreathed by the motto, Ars 
gratia artis ("Art for art's sake").4  
 
The moralist is outraged that the aesthete ignores matters of supreme 
importance—or worse, trivializes or mocks them.  Lacking the guidance of moral 
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values, the aesthete cannot be trusted and may turn to obscenity or cruelty or 
blasphemy.  The aesthete, however, fears the numbing anaesthetic of moralism, and 
frets that the vitality of art will be smothered by the life-denying impulse to censor and 
control, which teaches us to mistrust or restrain our expressive natures.   
 
Both are in agreement on one point: the arts are powerful.  Through a 
combination of craft and vision, the artist produces something that can mesmerize a 
viewer, transport a listener or a reader, or leave an audience spellbound.  From paint on 
canvas, molded clay, words read or sung, are generated measurable physiological 
changes, welling emotions or alterations in mood, intense concentration, piercing 
insight, and treasured memories. The potent magic of art can bewitch, bother, and 
bewilder.  But, for the moralist, that is precisely the danger.  Without fidelity to truth and 
moral goodness, the "magic" of the artist is a sham.  The power of the arts then flows 
not from divine inspiration or profound truth, but from the frailty, the gullibility of the 
human soul and the cleverness of the artist in manipulating illusions to suggest reality.   
In the end, the art object is artificial, not the real thing.  Seduced by the beauty or 
vividness or drama, the audience is "played upon" and affected by nothing more than 
someone's fantasy—greasepaint and lighting, costume and makeup, horsetail on 
catgut.  Beguiled again, the audience finds no epiphany, only dupery.  
 
Despite this mistrust, there has long been hope of reconciliation between art and 
morality.  One possible path is to recognize the arts as a useful or even necessary 
component in moral education.  Plato, after all, claimed that the love of beauty can lead 
us to the good, and he required all citizens of his normative republic to spend the early 
years of their education learning musike (a combination of arts and humanities).  Early 
Confucians believed that "the superior man...tries to promote music as a means to the 
perfection of human culture."   The Christian church acknowledged the importance of 
the arts in creating the proper atmosphere for worship, in portraying God's beauty and 
power, and in teaching religious doctrine.   Unfortunately, this path is very slippery.  
Make the connection between artistic experience and moral ends too loose and the 
moralist may not get the desired results (who knows what will be the effects of exposure 
to poetry or painting?).  Make the connection too tight and the aesthete will protest (art 
will degenerate, becoming vapidly sentimental, or homogenized and propagandistic).  
Another path to reconciliation is to claim that by rejecting "narrow moral concerns," art 
(at least, great art) can lead us to "a higher morality."  This approach is favored by such 
aesthetes as Friedrich Nietzsche, Percy Shelly, and Oscar Wilde.  Shelly, for example, 
writes in his Preface to the tragedy, The Cenci: 
 
There must be nothing attempted to make the exhibition subservient to 
what is vulgarly termed a moral purpose.  The highest moral purpose 
aimed at in the highest species of the drama, is the teaching of the human 
heart, through its sympathies and antipathies, the knowledge of itself; in 
proportion to the possession of which knowledge, every human being is 
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wise, just, sincere, tolerant and kind.5 
 
The peril here is that the "higher morality" at the summit may look nothing like what the 
poor moralist began with below; going "beyond good and evil" is an excellent adventure, 
but one likely to produce delusions or the outright loss of what the moralist holds dear.  






In 1989, the tension between art and morality exploded into a kulturkampf.  Here 
are some vignettes from the culture wars: 
 
1. On May 18, 1989, Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R-NY), in high dudgeon on the 
Senate floor, tore into pieces a reproduction of a photograph by artist Andres Serrano.  
He fumed that "[T]his so-called piece of art is a deplorable, despicable display of 
vulgarity."  He wondered aloud if "this is what contemporary art has sunk to...this 
outrage, this indignity," and condemned it as "filth" and "garbage."  He was quickly 
supported by the intrepid Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who said, "If we have sunk so 
low in this country as to tolerate and condone this sort of thing, then we become part of 
it.  This speech launched the battle over government support for the arts.  The good 
senators had been made aware of the offending photograph by a letter (April 5, 1989) 
from the Reverend Donald Wildmon, the executive director of the American Family 
Association; Mr. Wildmon is the religious activist who led a national boycott of the film, 
The Last Temptation of Christ.6  
 
The now-famous incendiary photograph was described by the New York Times 
as follows: 
[A photograph measuring] 60 inches by 40 inches and show[ing] Jesus on 
the cross in a golden haze through a smattering of minute bubbles against 
a dark, blood-colored background.  By slight twisting and considerable 
enlargement, the image takes on a monumental appearance and the 
viewer would never guess that a small plastic crucifix was used.  The work 
appears reverential, and it is only after reading the provocative and 
explicit label that one realizes the object has been immersed in urine.7 
 
The "provocative" title of the photograph was Piss Christ. 
 
  The vociferous battle launched by Serrano's work brought cries of 
"freedom of speech," "artistic merit," "censorship," and also "religious bigotry," 
and "sponsorship of moral depravity"; the result was a public law that is a, 
shall I say, "watered down" version of Helms's first proposal (PL 101-102), a 
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"hunkering down" by artists and government-sponsoring agencies, and, oh 
yes, increased fame for Andres Serrano. 
 
2.  In June the controversy spilled over when the Corcoran Gallery of Art in 
Washington, D.C., cancelled its scheduled exhibit, Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect 
Moment. The Washington Post claimed that the Corcoran did not wish to become 
embroiled in the political controversy over art, and—given the sexual content of some of 
Mapplethorpe's photographs—did not want to provide an exhibit which would galvanize 
the Congressional move to reduce funding for the NEA.  (The Corcoran came to pay 
dearly for this decision with the resignation of its chief curator and several trustees, later 
the resignation of  its director, the loss of ten percent of its membership, the withdrawal 
of numerous artists from scheduled exhibitions, the altered wills of significant donors, 
and the condemnation of various groups in the arts.)  Less than a year later, the 
Mapplethorpe retrospective was booked for the Contemporary Arts Center in Cincinnati, 
Ohio.  With a long history of movie and theater closings and anti-pornography 
ordinances, Cincinnati police decided to shut down the exhibit. A grand jury indicted the 
Center and its director, Dennis Barrie, for "pandering obscenity" and child pornography. 
 Apparently, this is the first time in U.S. history that a museum and its director have 
been so charged.  Both were eventually acquitted. 
 
The exhibition contained 175 photographs, including three special portfolios 
(named X, Y, and Z) of 13 photographs each.  Portfolio Y contained images of flowers.  
The "obscenity" came from Portfolio X, which contained homoerotic and 
sadomasochistic images (which the New York Times characterized as "anal and penile 
penetration with unusual objects"), and Portfolio Z, which contained figure studies, 
including some of children.  Mapplethorpe had required these portfolios to be exhibited 
in three juxtaposed rows, perhaps inviting comparisons of sensuality or composition.  
Adding to the intensity and pathos of this retrospective was the fact that the 
photographer had died of AIDS in March of 1989.8 
 
3. In September of 1988, Salmon Rushdie had published The Satanic Verses.  
India banned the book as blasphemous in October and was soon followed by at least 
eleven other nations.  In 1989, it was burned by Muslims in England.  In Iran, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for the death of the author and his publishers, 
and assuring those who carried out the act of martyrdom.  Several large bookstore 
chains withdrew the books—mostly out of justified fear for the safety of employees and 
patrons.  Since then, Rushdie has lived in hiding, his marriage has dissolved, his Italian 
and Japanese translators and his Norwegian publisher have been critically wounded or 
killed, and several moderate Muslim leaders have been assassinated for decrying 
censorship of the book.  
 
The style of the novel itself is one which makes distinguishing the real from the 
imaginary all but impossible—magical realism.  Ironically, Rushdie claims that the novel 
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itself speaks to the controversy it generated:  "At the beginning of Islam, you have a 
conflict between the sacred text and the profane text, between revealed literature and 
imagined literature."   The fatwa was reaffirmed after the death of Khomeini despite 
apologies by Rushdie; it remains in effect today9. 
 
4.   This past year, the Phoenix Art Museum mounted an exhibit called "Old 
Glory: The American Flag in Contemporary Art."   One piece titled What is the Proper 
Way to Display the American Flag? requires viewers who sign a guestbook to step on 
the flag; another piece, by Kate Millett, displays an American flag streaming from a 
toilet.  Veterans have been outraged and picketed the exhibit.  There have been 
shoving matches and threats of violence.10 
 
*     *     * 
 
One of the distressing aspects of these controversies is the way in which 
positions have become rigid and more extreme.  What I earlier called the moralistic 
viewpoint is now represented by fundamentalism, the Religious Right.  What I mean 
by a fundamentalist is someone who believes (1) that morality is a matter of following 
God's commands; (2) that a specific sacred text is the revealed will of God to the 
believer, who should therefore grant it absolute inerrancy and a literal interpretation; 
and (3) that this moral viewpoint is the only valid one.   (Many fundamentalists also 
believe that the political order in which they find themselves should rest on these 
principles; they frequently base their reformist goal on a claim of history.  I shall not 
include that claim in my definition here.) 
 
The response of fundamentalists in cases like those cited above is first, of 
course, outrage and disgust: is nothing sacred?  There is confidence that a 
confrontation with the artworks themselves (or sometimes with a mere verbal account of 
them) will be sufficient to provoke similar responses in others.  Thus the prosecutor in 
the Cincinnati case, Frank Prouty, simply summoned the police to court, played the 
videotape of the Mapplethorpe exhibit, and said, "The pictures are the state's case."11  
That was all, and he rested the case for the people.  Similarly, Senators D'Amato and 
Helms and the Ayatollah Khomeini had no doubts that Serrano's Piss Christ and 
Rushdie's Satanic Verses were religious slurs, respectively, of course.   This reaction is 
often followed by the suspicion that there is a conspiracy of artists and academics who 
are seeking to undermine all that is moral and noble.  Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich hastily reacted to the Arizona flag exhibit, calling it "a prime example of the 
'elite' values that Republicans hope to defeat in this year's election."12  These 
fundamentalist moralists share several tendencies: they focus, of course, on the 
apparent content of the works; they assume that content straightforwardly displays the 




How does the Cultural Left respond to the Religious Right?  Consider the 1992 
case in which feminist law professor Catharine MacKinnon and her students forced the 
University of Michigan to cancel an exhibition called Porn' im'age'ry: Picturing 
Prostitutes.  This collection, primarily of photographs, was prepared by women—two of 
whom had been prostitutes.  MacKinnon called the exhibit dangerous to women.  She 
had not actually seen the exhibit, but a description of the contents was sufficient; she 
already had the conviction that pornographic images were harmful to women.  In this 
and so many other recent examples, the Cultural Left is judging art by its political 
correctness.13   
 
The fundamentalists and the Cultural Left are in agreement in the view that all art 
is ideological, that a work of art conveys a set of values.  Both sides adopt a moralistic 
position, that is, both ascribe to the belief that art should be judged first by moral 
standards (though of course they differ sharply on the matter of what standards are 
valid).  And both are willing to censor based on their standards.  Interestingly, both also 
focus on content as the vehicle for the presentation of values.   As a result, both Right 
and Left assume that representation is de facto advocacy, and they dismiss claims to 
the contrary, claims of interpretation or artist's intent, as irrelevant or disingenuous.  
 
What has happened to aestheticism?  It is still dominant in the artworld in a 
variety known as formalism, and it stands in opposition to the moralistic position at 
either end of the political spectrum.  Clive Bell, the influential Bloomsbury group critic, 
proclaimed that aesthetic emotion is evoked in the observer by the significant form of 
the work; these objects achieve a timelessness and belong to "a kingdom not of this 
world."14  Aesthetic meaning and value inhere in the work itself—the artist's biography 
or intent, the social or historical context, the audience are separable and superfluous.15  
 
The contrast between contemporary moralism and contemporary aestheticism is 
epitomized in an episode from the Cincinnati Arts Center trail.  The first witness called 
by the defense was Janet Kardon, an expert in contemporary art and the organizer of 
the Mapplethorpe retrospective.  Kardon, described in print as "an older, respectable 
woman" begins by explaining what a museum is, what a director's job is, and what a 
retrospective show is.   She asserts that Robert Mapplethorpe is "one of the most 
important photographers working in the 80's in a formalist mode."  She explains 
formalism.   When prosecutor Prouty takes over, he asks her to give the court a 
"formalist analysis" of each of the allegedly obscene photographs.   Prouty referred to 
the "self-portrait of Mapplethorpe with the handle of a whip inserted in his anus"; 
Kardon called it "almost classical in its composition."   She delighted in the strong 
opposing diagonals in a piece involving urination.  She spoke of the photographer's 
preference for "an extremely central image" in one of the pictures.  Prouty asked, 
"That's the one where the forearm of one individual is inserted into the anus of another 
individual?"  "Yes," she answered and proceeded to show similar composition in his 
flower pictures.  Referring to the image of a man with his finger inserted into his penis, 
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she says, "Oh yes, Robert thought the hand gestures in this one were particularly 
beautiful."  Prouty asks, "Did you ever consider whether homosexual values were 
appropriate for the community?"   "We never discussed that," Kardon testifies.16 
 
  Was there ever a clearer confrontation in the culture wars?   The moralist, fixed 
on representational content; the aesthete, entranced with form and lighting and texture. 
 The aesthete regards the moralist's approach as unsophisticated; the moralist finds the 
aesthete oblivious to the obvious or perhaps infected by artspeak and a vacuous 
connoisseurship.  The moralist is judging by cherished moral values; the aesthete 
keeps the concept of artistic merit hermetically sealed from direct moral judgments.  
  






Paintings and sculptures, poems and plays, have a peculiar ontological status.  If 
they are representational, they depict something.  What is depicted is not real, yet it is 
not unrelated to reality.  (Mimetic theorists like Plato are likely to give works of art a 
lower ontological status than the physical reality they imitate, but perhaps it makes as 
much sense to think of art as surreal, as "reality plus.")   Like Ovid's Pygmalion, who 
falls in love with the statue he sculpts, the artist and the viewer may be "taken in."  
Lucien Freud, the English painter has written: 
 
A moment of complete happiness never occurs in the creation of a work of 
art.  The promise of it is felt in the act of creation, but disappears toward 
the completion of the work.  For it is then that the painter realises that it is 
only a picture he is painting.  Until then he had almost dared to hope that 
the picture might spring to life.17 
 
It is this paradoxical nature of art that produces its "magic," its power to bewitch, bother, 
and bewilder us.  It is akin to metaphor and dream.  Art is virtual reality.  
  
The problem with the moralism of fundamentalists and the aestheticism of 
formalists is that neither can accept the artistic paradox and both force a resolution.  
Formalists unhinge art from reality altogether, discarding its image-content and its 
sources of inspiration, and leaving the experts sounding foolish and baffled about what 
art is and what makes some of it very good.  Art is terribly important, it seems, yet 
unrelated to human experience.  Fundamentalists (along with the moralists of the 
Cultural Left) equate art with reality—thus portrayal is advocacy, the word is the deed, 
and the fantasy is the fact.  A fundamentalist believes, remember, that the sacred text 
must be read literally.  This literalism is carried over to other texts, other aesthetic 
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experiences as well.  So is the notion that the purpose of the words or pictures or sound 
is to convey a message, to impart a moral, to advocate.  Art is moral. 
 
The Cultural Left thinks art is political.  It contains postmodernist voices which 
assert that all artworks are ideological (an observation which plays into the hands of the 
fundamentalists).  Yet it is not that works of art are "real" in a traditional sense.  First of 
all, for the postmodernist, the idea of reality has to be discarded.  No, it's not simply a 
matter of the blind men and the elephant, where each observer has a different, 
personal, and equally valid interpretation of the beast's reality.  Well, it is a bit like that—
there are diverse interpretations—it’s just that there never was an elephant.  And the 
reason we thought there was probably has something to do with the fact that the 
observers were all men.  For the Postmodernist, then, reality is but a pastiche of 
interpretations.  This, in its way, also collapses the distinction between the artworld and 
"real life," between image and reality, between performer and audience.  Avant garde 
theater, photography, and performance art are media which exploit this ambiguity.  (The 
fact that Mapplethorpe's depictions were photographs rather than paintings or 
narratives contributed to the intensity of the response—after all, those were pictures of 
real people who actually did those things...and in front of a man with a camera!)  
 
When the peculiarly paradoxical status of art works is collapsed in either 
direction, something important is lost.  Art is reduced to only two options: either (1) it 
advocates something, has a moral, carries an ideological message—in which case, we 
must be attentive that it promotes our own ideology (however arbitrary that may be); or 
(2) it amuses, it entertains and gives pleasure and diversion—which may be either 
construed as harmless but trivial, or (more puritanically) a dreadful waste of time.  
Serious art, art which is not directed to either advocacy or amusement, cannot be 
accounted for and is therefore denied existence.  Where is the liberal theory of art, a 
theory that would respect the ontological incongruity and ground the seriousness of art 





When liberals have responded to the public flaps over offending art, they have 
turned quickly to the principle of freedom of expression and use the First Amendment 
like a mantra.  Paintings and novels are, like speech, a form of expression that is (or 
should) be guaranteed basic legal protection.  While artists (even formalists) might 
prefer that the defense was based on aesthetic considerations, they are usually willing 
to take refuge in this line of argument and are grateful for the shield that protects 
creative freedom seen as so necessary to their work.  Although this approach make the 
issue turn on such morally-grounded notions as "liberty" and "rights," the fundamentalist 
is appalled that the issue of the morality of the content of the work (and its possible 
effects on the audience) is set aside, as beyond the reach of public concern and 
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certainly of public control.    
 
At least the principle of freedom of expression does recognize the difference 
between word and deed, between fantasy and fact.  In the United States, of course, 
there are important areas in which the distinction is collapsible—the "clear and present 
danger" doctrine, and obscenity laws where "redeeming social value or artistic merit" is 
the positive test, and, recently, laws against hate speech.  Convinced of the power of 
art to change those who look and listen; sure of antisocial and immoral consequences 
from offensive art (both individual works and the cumulative effect of many such works); 
and linking the current fraying of the social fabric, rise in violence, and loss of civility 
causally to the presence of offensive art, moralists of many ethical persuasions, even 
liberals, are tempted to join the fundamentalists in resolving the ontological paradox, 
collapsing the distinction between art and the real world.  The word is the deed, the 
picture is the act—the lyrics of "Gangsta Rap" are acts against police, women, and 
Whites; Mapplethorpe's photographs are seductions into homosexual and 
sadomasochistic episodes.  While one might wonder whether art is that powerful, 
whether exposure to art really is that capable of modifying behavior (and indeed the 
empirical evidence for such a connection could not be found by two national 
commissions on pornography), humanists are haunted by the infamous episode of 
Goethe's publication of The Sorrows of Young Werther, a romantic tale of a young 
man's suicide, which launched a wave of suicides across Europe.    
 
But is the best defense simply to resort to personal freedom and perhaps our 
right to private (aesthetic) amusement?  Is there no more robust theory that can defend 
art on its merits?  What is the purpose of art in a democracy?  What have democratic 
theorists had to say about the purposes of art?  It is surprising—shocking, really—that 
there is so little discussion of the arts in the history of democratic theory.  After all, the 
Age of Pericles, the dawning of democracy, was marked by a florescence of public art.  
(Totalitarians, incidentally, discerning a way to combine art's power with their moral and 
political aims, have certainly found easily adaptable aesthetic theories penned by the 
likes of Plato, Marx, and Hegel.)   But John Locke is virtually silent on the issue. And 
Rousseau is, as usual, surprising: the author of the Social Contract turns out to be a 
severe moralist and censor.  He wrote a long public letter, the Letter to d'Alembert, in 
which he broke with the Encyclopaedists and argued that his home city of Geneva 
should not have a civic theater.  His reasoning is complex, but he concluded that the 
craft of acting, the lifestyle of actors, the content of plays, the effects of the audience—
all are corrupting of important moral values.  However, he starts from the premise that 
the theater is a form of amusement.18  John Stuart Mill discusses the issue rarely, 
usually obliquely and in terms of liberty.  (Even his essay on Coleridge is a discussion of 
epistemology and not aesthetics directly.)19   Immanuel Kant (who asserts that "the 
beautiful is the symbol of the morally good") offers a conception of aesthetic experience 
and judgment that links our transcendental nature with our sensory experience, but 
there is no discussion of social purposes.20  Two interesting and perhaps relevant ideas 
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may be found:  Friedrich Schiller, though Kantian in outlook, does add the important 
claim that moral education requires an experience of beauty.21  Alexander Baumgarten, 
the first to use the term "aesthetics" philosophically, describes the sensory world as 
"confusion's field" (campus confusionis), but by ingenious wordplay he means to imply 
not the logical confusion and irrationality that rationalists imply to it, but the unifying 
(con-fusion) of diverse particulars in the act of perception.22 
 
We might note that there are two separable models of democracy, both sharing 
the foundational idea that citizens should determine public policy for themselves, and 
that citizens are equal in casting one vote.  The first and older notion (modeled perhaps 
on the Greek φράτρα, a clan, club, or brotherhood) conceives democracy as an equality 
among similars; the unity of citizenship is achieved by ignoring or excluding difference.  
The second and more recent notion is that democracy is a moral climate in which 
everyone's experience is valid and useful in the communal construction of knowledge 
and the good; here diversity is prized and unity is achieved through the cooperative 
application of this experience to social improvement.  Tradition is valued not as an 
unassailable source of truth, but as the legacy of human experience. 
 
  Though fundamentalism is often attracted to totalitarianism, it may have no 
difficulty accepting the older view of democracy.  Both share a commitment to a fixed 
moral order.  All important moral issues have been settled—except for insuring that 
existing citizens comply and that the revered truths are passed on to a new generation. 
 Of course, fundamentalism has profound opposition to the newer conception. The idea 
that the moral order is constructed, that morality is open-ended and that our moral 
sensitivities and understanding can change and grow; that the very diversity of  moral 
viewpoints can be valuable rather than dangerous—all of these are anathema to the 
fundamentalist. 
  
Let's call the older conception of democracy the Periclean and the newer one the 
Deweyan, for John Dewey, who advanced it in many works over a long life.  Dewey is 
one philosopher of liberal democracy who does have a complex and rich theory of 
aesthetics.   He asserts, in Art as Experience, that "art is more moral than moralities."23 
  This is an interesting claim; it is not simply, as Dewey develops it, another version of 
the "art responds to a higher morality" claim of some aesthetes.  First, note the plural: 
"moralities."  Dewey is referring to moral codes, fixed interpretations of moral values, 
what he calls "consecrations of the status quo."  Art, by its very virtuality, its paradoxical 
nature, is both real and not real; it extends and transcends our experience, and yet, in 
the end, provides observers with a new, aesthetic experience.  Dewey claims that art 
"has been the means of keeping alive the sense of purposes that outrun evidence and 
of meanings that transcend indurated habit."  Our first intimations of a redirection of 
desires and values requires imagination.  Paradoxically, it is the indifference to 
conventional praise and blame that gives art its moral potency.  Art insinuates 
possibilities of human relations not necessarily sanctioned by moral rules and precepts 
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and literal readings of existing texts, and thereby becomes a well-spring of values.  As 
Salmon Rushdie says, art brings newness into the world.24  It is a mistake, Dewey 
cautions, to expect this of each art work, taken one by one.  It is rather the cumulative 
effect of the arts of an era.  Nor can we expect to judge the actual contribution of any 
given work in a short span of time.  That's why freedom is valued—not only to permit a 
playful and unfettered imagination, but also to prevent a premature judgment based on 
any fixed and final sense of the moral. 
  
Does this liberal interpretation of aesthetic experience require that we abandon 
our moral values?  No, not at all.  We are left in the ironic posture of having and acting 
upon defensible moral commitments, yet simultaneously knowing that other, quite 
different commitments may be found defensible as well.25  As Wendy Steiner has 
written, we should expect "a situation in which art and the life of the mind can be 
enjoyed with a knowing pleasure, one that thrills to every richness art can offer, yet 
does not shrink from the issues that art can raise...aware at the same time that it is still 
art and not something else."26 
 
 








Special Note:  Daniel R. DeNicola has been Provost and Professor of Philosophy at 
Gettysburg College since 1996.  He may be reached at ddenicol@gettysburg.edu.  When 
this lecture was delivered in the spring of 1996, he was Professor of Philosophy at Rollins 
College.  The paper’s references are contemporary to that date.     
 
1.  This paper was delivered as the Master of Liberal Studies Program (MLS) Lecture at Rollins 
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Atlantic Center for the Arts in February 1990; an edited transcript of that forum was published by 
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